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The Penumbra of Weimar Political
Culture: Pacifism, Feminism, and Social
Democracy
by Shelley E. Rose
This article offers a new reading of Germany’s complex political culture,
exploring the contributions of pacifists, international feminists, and Social
Democrats as proactive, yet marginalized, participants in Weimar-era politics. Through a series of historical events including the No-More-War protests, international education courses, pacifist reading sessions, and a
transnational peace exhibit, the author demonstrates dynamic exchanges
between party and informal politics on the political Left. This interaction,
as well as expanding transnational networks and awareness, opened new
political spaces for peace activism in the Weimar Republic, the effects of
which still endure today.

The disappointing end of the Weimar Republic in the rise of National
Socialism has inspired a broad body of scholarship on German militarism that downplays the influence of pacifism in German political culture. Historian Richard Bessel, for example, asserts that pacifism
‘‘found no appreciable echo in Weimar politics.’’ Furthermore, he
argues it ‘‘remains one of the most telling characteristics of the political
culture of inter-war Germany that pacifism failed to make a significant
impact after so awful and senseless an armed conflict.’’1 Bessel pits the
failure of pacifism against the appeal of militarism in Weimar Germany,
emphasizing pacifists’ marginal position in a political culture dominated
by conservative institutions and the tacit acceptance of violence.
Historian Jennifer Anne Davy addresses these arguments in her analysis
of Weimar antimilitarists. Acknowledging the ‘‘broad spectrum of
[Weimar] political factions’’ which embraced masculine and militaristic
rhetoric, Davy draws attention to the urgent need to reevaluate the

role of pacifism during the Weimar Republic.2 Indeed, militarism
comprised only one thread of continuity in a Weimar tapestry that also
contained nationalism, communism, mainstream pacifism, Social
Democracy, and international feminism. By emphasizing the dominance of militarism in Weimar political culture, Bessel and others
obscure the significance of noncommunist Left-wing groups, many of
which had rich foundations in the late nineteenth century and
resurfaced as active participants in West Germany’s post-World War II
democracy.
This investigation focuses on four case studies of Weimar-era
peace activism: the 1920s No-More-War (Nie-Wieder-Krieg) protests,
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
international education courses, German Pacifist Student Union
(Deutscher Pazifistischer Studentenbund—DPSt) public reading sessions from 1925 to 1927, and the 1927 transnational peace exhibit
‘‘Peace Movements and Peace Activism in All Countries,’’ which
toured in five German cities. Each example represents a crossroads
between national politics and transnational networks exemplified by
individual efforts to participate in both arenas.3 These educational
events reflect the ambitions of pacifists, feminists, and Social Democrats to be proactive participants in Weimar political culture as they
mobilized around issues of peace and established provisional traditions
of cooperation between party and periphery groups.
NEGOTIATING WEIMAR POLITICAL SPACE

I draw on a core ⁄ penumbra model developed by early modern historians Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones to better understand the
complicated political relationship between pacifism and Social Democracy.4 In their understanding, the core represented formal medical
institutions in early modern France and the penumbra were formed by
various healers, so-called quacks, and other social actors at the edge
of the institutional core. The authors employ the term ‘‘penumbra’’
instead of ‘‘periphery’’ to emphasize permeability and exchange
between the core and marginalized participants in the medical world.
The noncommunist Left within Weimar political culture can be considered in similar terms. The core ⁄ penumbra model implies a constant
intermingling of ideas, members, and strategies between formal party
politics and grassroots activism. This framework facilitates the evaluation of Social Democrats, pacifists, and feminists within national

political culture while at the same time, it emphasizes moments of
cooperation and conflict between mainstream party members and
supporters of grass-roots activism. Transnational networks and ideas
also were more freely exchanged and fostered at the edge of the
formal party system.
The complex relationship of the German Social Democratic Party
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands-SPD), commonly known as
a ‘‘peace party,’’ to the peace movement makes the German Left a
particularly suitable illustration for this new investigation into the
development of transnational awareness within political culture.
Though ideologically compatible, cooperation between pacifists and
Social Democrats was often stymied by class and political tensions
before and during the Weimar era. Dieter Riesenberger, for example,
describes late nineteenth and early twentieth century tensions between
the party and the predominantly bourgeois peace movement well.
Riesenberger asserts that party leaders saw the Socialist Second
International fundamentally as an ‘‘anti-war movement.’’ This point is
reinforced by Wolfram Wette’s observation that Social Democrats
tended toward basically pacifist politics. Mutual distrust obstructed
coordinated efforts between the two, however, and Riesenberger contends pre-World War I Social Democratic cooperation with bourgeois
pacifists was simply not feasible.5 Indeed, the party’s subsequent votes
for war credits revealed the distance between Social Democratic politics and peace politics during World War I. This conflict led independent Social Democrats, many of whom were pacifists, to split from the
SPD and form the Independent Social Democratic Party (Unabhängige
Sozialdemokratische Deutschlands- USPD). The two parties remained
separate until 1922, setting the institutional framework for the
Weimar Left.6
Although the official relationship between party and movement
during the Weimar Republic remained tenuous, many individual pacifists recognized the SPD as the best chance for party political support.
Traditional socialist commitments to international reconciliation and
the fact that many pacifists sympathized with, or were members of,
the SPD created a strong affinity and fostered exchange between the
two groups.7 In her study of women voters during the Weimar Republic, historian Julia Sneeringer usefully illustrates that ‘‘[l]ived identities
of gender, class, ethnicity, [and] age … are inherently unstable and
constantly in competition, existing in a kind of overlapping simultaneity.’’8 Sneeringer argues party political discourse ‘‘flattened out’’ the

complexities of voter identity, targeting one ‘‘dominant’’ characteristic.
Faced with the challenges of party politics in the new republic, the
SPD underestimated the impact of increasing transnationalism and
cooperation between pacifists and Social Democrats in their constituency. Weimar pacifists and Social Democrats often identified concurrently with the party and peace movements, creating moments of
cooperation and tension when individuals were forced to prioritize
political goals. Party leaders remained willing to compromise pacifist
positions in the name of preserving political influence in the unfolding
spaces of democracy. Rank and file party members, however, were not
so easily persuaded to abandon their pacifist convictions and identify
solely with party disciplinary expectations.
Each of the following four case studies features key individuals:
Walter Fabian, Gerda Weyl, Gerhart Seger, and Constanze Hallgarten,
pacifist Social Democrats or Social Democratic sympathizers whose
‘‘lived identities’’ connected party politics and pacifist agendas. Just as
prominent liberal Ludwig Quidde established links between his pacifism
and role in the German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei-DVP) in
the 1890s, pacifists Fabian, Weyl, Seger, and Hallgarten established connections between Social Democracy and pacifism during the Weimar
Republic.9 Although each activist came from a different social and political background, their behavior reveals significant exchange and cooperation among and between these Left groups and an interest in
promoting transnational awareness in that focused arena. These four
key activists highlight the changing dynamics between party and pacifists as well as sites of national and transnational tension, beginning with
their activities in the No-More-War demonstrations and ending with the
transnational peace exhibit in Munich.
PEACE POLITICS IN THE STREET

As a university student in Berlin, Freiburg, Giessen, and Leipzig
between 1920 and 1924, Fabian navigated the permeable space between
party and popular politics. Over the course of the Weimar period, he
participated in No-More-War demonstrations, taught WILPF vacation
courses, and was a member of the DPSt. He also became a member of
the German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft- DFG), one of
the largest pacifist organizations in Germany, when it was reestablished
in 1919. While completing his thesis on the pacifist philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, Fabian recognized a link between pacifism and

socialism which he applied in his own activism.10 He emphasized a
‘‘new beginning’’ for the peace movement in 1919, which was augmented by a new purpose for Weimar pacifists. According to Fabian, the
primary tasks for post-World War I activists were to combat the common prewar notion that military conflicts were inevitable and remind
German citizens of the dangers of modern warfare- both tasks embraced
by participants in the No-More-War rallies.11
Weimar activists staged No-More-War demonstrations on the
anniversary of the outbreak of World War I in cities across Germany
and in international venues. The first public demonstration occurred
in Berlin on August 1, 1920, and participants from diverse pacifist
organizations planned the event. Although the socialist parties did not
officially endorse the 1920 rally, many SPD and USPD members supported No-More-War events by 1921. In fact, Riesenberger attributes
the success of these subsequent rallies to the support of the SPD and
USPD.12 The annual protests, therefore, represent one prominent site
where significant numbers of party members and pacifists interacted
and core political support proved crucial for success. Between 100,000
and 200,000 individuals participated in the 1921 Berlin rally and
approximately 500,000 demonstrated in solidarity across Germany.
Fabian estimates 100,000 people packed around him in the Berlin
Pleasure Garden (Lustgarten) for a demonstration that had ‘‘international character and led to a highpoint of the international peace
movement.’’13 Photos of the Pleasure Garden support the accuracy of
Fabian’s description. They depict men and women packed shoulderto-shoulder in the approximately five acres between buildings, overflowing into the colonnade of the Old Museum and even standing on
nearby statues.14
Fabian does not explicitly connect the SPD or socialist labor
unions with the dynamic No-More-War protests in his memoirs,
although there is significant evidence of a Social Democratic presence.15 Prominent signs declaring ‘‘No More War!’’ mix with others
in the photos announcing SPD groups among the participants, offering
visual confirmation of Social Democratic support in 1921. Party members mingled with informal political actors, including pacifists, and the
rallies served their purpose as a reminder of the atrocities of World
War I. The No-More-War protests demonstrated both the expansion
and strengthening of transnational pacifist networks and informal
interaction between pacifists, international feminists, and Social Democrats in the broader arena of German national political culture.16

Pacifism and Social Democracy blended more explicitly outside
Germany in a 1921 Paris memorial service for slain French antimilitarist and Social Democrat Jean Jaurés, which was conducted under the
No-More-War banner. Arthur Crispien, a leading Independent Social
Democrat who joined the SPD a year later, spoke at the ceremony.
His appearance was a powerful symbol of the cooperation between
pacifists and socialists in Germany and France, two former World
War I enemies that Jaurés had attempted to keep from military conflict before he was assassinated in 1914. From Dortmund to Leipzig,
Germans read in their mainstream newspapers about Crispien’s
appearance, an important transnational event, and the growing popularity of No-More-War activities.17
Indeed, newspapers represented a critical publicity instrument
for these popular demonstrations, fostering rich exchanges between
core and penumbra. Just as in Brockliss and Jones’s Habermasian
interpretation of the French medical world, media played a key role in
Weimar political culture. In Berlin, the main Social Democratic newspaper Vorwärts advertised regularly for the No-More-War demonstration in the weeks prior to the 1921 rally, announcing on July 20 that
Social Democrats from greater Berlin ‘‘officially’’ decided on ‘‘active
participation in the…. peace demonstration ‘No-More-War!’’’ The
author invited not only all comrades but ‘‘all friends of the idea of
international understanding’’ to get involved.18 This endorsement
encouraged support for the fledgling peace demonstrations, which
were already located on the margins of Weimar political culture.
As the demonstration date loomed closer, Vorwärts printed various
notices for participants including lists of demonstrations in other German cities and planned SPD speakers for the Berlin rally. A front-page
article from July 24, 1921, describing preparations for both German
and foreign rallies, is particularly telling.19 The publicity committee’s
combination of German and English, such as ‘‘Friedensmeeting,’’
and repeated use of English words textually reflects a transnational
awareness between the founders of the British ‘‘No More War’’
movement, among others, and the German ‘‘Nie-Wieder-Krieg’’ demonstrations.
The British monthly publication No More War contains further
evidence of cooperation between German No-More-War activists and
demonstrators around the world. The February 1922 edition featured
an article with the title ‘‘‘No More War:’ British, French and German
Resisters on One Platform.’’ The article highlighted Martha Steinitz,

Berlin secretary of the German Union of War Resisters, who traveled
to London to promote German and international No-More-War activities. Steinitz’s speech ‘‘in almost perfect English’’ caught the attention
of British antimilitarists and her vivid description of the ‘‘remarkable’’
series of No-More-War rallies in Germany prompted British activists
to plan their own demonstrations. German pacifists were also influenced by descriptions of British activism in No More War. One German mother wrote that she received a copy of the monthly ‘‘from an
old English friend… [and] was deeply impressed by the contents.’’ In
addition, No More War frequently mentioned cross-border interaction
between activists including an exchange program that encouraged contact between English and German families ‘‘holding similar views’’ in
1921 and 1922.20 Both German Vorwärts and British No More War
reports attest to transnational awareness on the Weimar political Left.
The relationship between the SPD and the numerous Weimar-era
pacifist organizations nonetheless was capricious. Party leaders frequently focused attention on national political interests at the expense
of pacifist goals. Peace historian Reinhold Lütgemeier-Davin observes
that despite early Social Democratic enthusiasm for the demonstrations, antimilitarist war veterans’ groups gradually took responsibility
for organization of the annual No-More-War rallies. Riesenberger
attributes the SPD leaders’ distance to internal tension over peace
mobilization in the newly reunited party and thwarted Social Democratic efforts to expand their role in the No-More-War leadership.21
SPD historian Heinrich Potthoff chronicles programmatic shifts in
party consciousness which occurred after the USPD joined the SPD in
1922. The 1925 Heidelberg party program reflected this merger with
a renewed focus on class struggle and an increasingly ‘‘Marxist tone.’’
Potthoff suggests that after 1925 the SPD limited its political focus to
the ‘‘formal functions of democratic institutions’’ and the ‘‘defense’’ of
Weimar democracy to make the transition for former USPD members
smoother.22 Ultimately, leading Social Democrats turned their attention inward to the national political core and away from controversial
extra-parliamentary pacifist activities in their efforts to preserve the
democratic system, which was increasingly under threat.
The Heidelberg program represented party leaders’ efforts to unite
a broadened spectrum of rank and file Social Democrats under one
universal agenda. Internal divisions remained and many Social Democrats continued to support the No-More-War protests. Although there
was significantly less publicity for the 1922 rallies than in the previous

year, Vorwärts printed a notice from the eve of the event that declared
the SPD ‘‘convincingly in agreement’’ with the No-More-War organizers. Reports also expressed enthusiasm for rallies in France and England.23 This party endorsement linked the rallies to core political
culture, lending further credibility to the cause. No-More-War maintained its momentum with demonstrations in more than 200 German
cities in 1922.24 In 1923, however, crisis struck both Germany and
the No-More-War protests. French and Belgian troops occupied the
critical Ruhr industrial region and were met by steady passive resistance from local workers. The war-devastated countries intended to
force reparations from an already financially distressed German population. Passive resistance to this military intrusion had a heavy price.
The continued stagnation of these main industrial, coal-producing
regions crippled the economy, leading to inflation and extreme hardship for many Germans.
In this unstable climate, Social Democratic Interior Minister Carl
Severing prohibited all public demonstrations and thereby severely
limited No-More-War activities. A notice for the annual No-MoreWar rallies appeared on the second page of the July 26, 1923 edition
of Vorwärts. As a result of the prohibition, organizers reduced the
mass No-More-War Berlin demonstrations of previous years to five
small gatherings in closed venues and cancelled outdoor marches.
Interested participants needed to pick up tickets distributed in threehour windows the preceding Friday and Saturday at each location.25
Although the tickets were free, this new system placed greater responsibility on individual demonstrators. They were now required to plan
ahead, choose a venue, and make an additional trip for tickets.
Reports in the British publication No More War noted the smaller
German meetings were a stark contrast to the highly visible, and considerably more accessible, open-air demonstrations held in previous
years. Vorwärts announcements for the demonstrations in 1924 suggest a similar compartmentalized arrangement on both the traditional
Sunday afternoon and the following Monday. This controlled environment did not, however, keep German No-More-War organizers from
calling for ‘‘rallies for world peace in all parts of the country.’’ British
reporters also drew attention to the participation of French, German,
and English speakers in Berlin rallies. When the police superintendent
prohibited Frenchman Paul Langevin from taking the stage at an
indoor rally, demonstrators read his prepared speech aloud.26 The
physical meeting space for transnational pacifist activists was

restricted, but their anti-war efforts continued to intrude into the
wider realm of Weimar political culture.
The No-More-War legacy is both lasting and complex despite
some historians’ negative assessments. Lütgemeier-Davin considers the
No-More-War rallies a failed experiment. He argues that ‘‘the peace
question as an integration-moment for pacifists, republicans, socialists,
and labor organizations’’ was not successful.27 Bessel also grounds his
conclusions about the disappointing impact of pacifism on Weimar
culture partially in Lütgemeier-Davin’s evaluation of the No-MoreWar initiative. By 1925, No-More-War events had indeed lost momentum, and Lütgemeier-Davin correctly argues that the mobilization
effort as a formula for lasting official SPD and peace movement cooperation was a disappointment. Pacifists, however, carried on the NoMore-War spirit, Fabian’s ‘‘high point’’ of the international peace
movement in Weimar Germany, and integrated its battle-cry into
other contexts. No-More-War reappeared during the May 1st labor
rallies, for instance. Pacifist student leader and Social Democrat Gerda
Weyl authored a front-page article in the DPSt’s newsletter ‘‘Young
Pacifists’’ (Pazifistische Jugend) in 1925 that firmly linked the May 1st
‘‘Anti-War Day’’ with the familiar ‘‘No-More-War’’ call.28 These
broad uses of the slogan received mixed reviews during the Weimar
era. Quidde and mainstream pacifists balked at the broad anti-militarist pacifist message promoted by the No-More-War rallies. However,
even Quidde admitted the general appeal of ‘‘No More War’’ lent a
certain freshness to the greater pacifist cause, attracting younger participants like Fabian and Weyl.29 The legacy of this dramatic collective
political action remained alive until the final years of the Republic and
even after World War II as participants fondly remembered it as a
moment of idyllic international cooperation.30
Although SPD support for organized peace activism like the NoMore-War demonstrations drastically diminished over the first half of
the 1920s, individual Social Democrats continued to participate in
transnational pacifist initiatives. The No-More-War movement provided pacifists with a visible outlet for their convictions. As the demonstrations lost support, organizations such as WILPF and DPSt filled
the void with alternative educational programs that drew attention to
the importance of peace and transnational cooperation. One of the
most effective strategies was the organization of activities such as
vacation courses, exhibits, and reading sessions. All three efforts
encouraged German citizens, and first-time voters in particular, to

participate in the new democracy and develop a political awareness
that defied national boundaries.
FEMINIST AND PACIFIST NETWORKS IN ACTION

WILPF groups across Europe hosted international summer and
vacation courses in an effort to promote domestic political participation, develop transnational networks, and instill a sense of urgency for
international reconciliation among young people. Drawing on its rich
tradition of international cooperation among women, WILPF provided
a critical framework for pacifist and feminist activism, strengthening
connections between German chapters and transnational networks by
bringing activists together across national borders.31 Historian Jo
Vellacott cites interpersonal contacts established in nineteenth-century
women’s social and suffrage networks as playing a ‘‘real and significant role in international understanding.’’32 These networks, Vellacott
argues, laid critical foundations for what she terms transnational
WILPF networks at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
twentieth century. WILPF leaders built on this tradition of personal
networks, organizing vacation courses that would serve as incubators
for renewed transnational contact during the 1920s.
In 1923, Fabian and his future wife Dora Heinemann participated
in WILPF vacation courses at the University of Geneva in Switzerland.33 Fabian remembers this cross-border collaboration warmly,
praising both the women’s organizations and the DFG for ‘‘cultivating
international connections’’ during the Weimar era. Colleague Detlef
Oppermann’s observation that Fabian’s World War II exile experiences were comparatively smoother than others attests to the enduring
strength of these connections. Oppermann attributes Fabian’s comparable good fortune in exile to his contacts in the former Czechoslovakia, France, and Switzerland, which he nurtured through his Weimar
‘‘political position.’’34 WILPF courses provided participants such as
Fabian with direct personal networking opportunities and fostered a
spirit of transnational cooperation. British organizers described these
activities best in 1921, dubbing their pedagogical ‘‘experiment’’ in
Salzburg ‘‘Education for Internationalism.’’35
The Salzburg summer school was a success, attracting more than
300 participants from eight countries and territories, including
Germany. Teachers conducted sessions in English, French, and
German. Though no direct translations were available to students,

linguistic diversity among the participants provided an opportunity to
escape the boundaries of one of the most prominent symbols of individual national identity: native language.36 German participant Gertrud
Baer described her feelings about the Salzburg school declaring, ‘‘International? The world today scoffs at the term and drags it through the
mud- but for us it has a lighter, warmer tone; a source of energy for
new action!’’ The ‘‘us’’ in Baer’s statement refers to the international
group of summer school participants ‘‘who got to know one another
through their common task,’’ revealing the strength of her identification
with these transnational connections.37 Baer’s enthusiastic report attests
to the success of the 1921 session and WILPF expanded offerings in
1922 to include Easter courses in England and two more summer
schools, one of which was organized and hosted by the German WILPF
branch at the Bavarian castle Lauenstein.38 These courses were a
welcome outlet for German students frustrated by the largely conservative and nationalist university environment of the Weimar period.
In light of this conservative university culture, Fabian describes
the efforts of organizations like the DPSt to sway nonpolitical or conservative university students to the pacifist cause. To this end, Berlin
DPSt leader Weyl incorporated transnational pacifist ideas into a
successful series of Leseabende (reading sessions) held from 1925 until
1927. A woman of many interests, Weyl’s personal biography provides insight into the behavior of a female pacifist Social Democrat in
the Weimar Republic. Entangled in various networks of pacifists and
socialists in a university environment that was rather unfriendly to
both, Weyl worked diligently in pacifist organizations such as the
DPSt and the League of Free Socialist Youth (Bund freier sozialistischer Jugend). As a leading student pacifist, she often represented both
groups at German Peace Cartel (Deutsche Friedenskartell- DFK) meetings in the 1920s.39 In a report on the 1925 ⁄ 1926 winter semester,
DPSt national press officer Rudolf Küstermeier recognized Weyl’s deep
commitment to the organization and her exceptional work. ‘‘The best
group is apparently Berlin,’’ Küstermeier claimed, ‘‘where Gerda Weyl
achieved promising improvements as deputy chairman, especially with
her pacifist reading sessions.’’40
The DPSt needed a rallying point in the turbulent scene of
Weimar pacifism. In October 1924, Weyl participated in the DPSt
Berlin Conference where the pacifist group formulated a tactical new
program that embraced all students ‘‘who fight against war as a crime
and advocate international cooperation.’’41 Roughly a year later, Weyl

launched the first reading sessions, encouraging exchanges of information and ideas through a broad range of themed meetings. The series
occurred at a critical moment in Weimar history and the history of
the DPSt as an organization. The year 1926 marked Germany’s acceptance into the League of Nations after years of negotiation and
brought a surge in domestic media attention to its activities.42 In the
midst of these political dialogues, the Berlin DPSt group initiated reading sessions that addressed diverse issues ranging from international
arbitration and peace to contemporary social tensions. The meetings
were well-publicized and open to all, not just students.43
Weyl’s initiative was not the first instance of ideological grassroots education in the political penumbra. Historian Jean Quataert’s
work on early Social Democratic women’s programs reveals that reading sessions organized by female Social Democrats in Berlin in the
early 1900s were part of a ‘‘long-standing commitment to continuous
education for [the] rank and file.’’ This ‘‘education of all by all’’
included guided discussions of works such as the Communist Manifesto and various programmatic documents of the SPD.44 The Social
Democratic tradition of ‘‘Women’s Meetings’’ continued even after
women gained the right to vote in 1919. These meetings took the
form of organized lectures, reading sessions, and other alternative
activities to general party meetings, which were characteristically not
well attended by female members.45 Weyl would have been familiar
with the tradition as a young Social Democrat and through her
mother, who participated in numerous Berlin Social Democratic
women’s clubs and social advocacy committees from the turn of the
century through the Weimar period. Weyl’s placement of the DPSt
flier collection with her mother’s papers at the Archive of Social
Democracy suggests that she linked her own reading sessions with this
common Social Democratic practice more explicitly than the documents alone reveal.46
The use of the reading session tradition reflects the impact of
Social Democratic women’s culture on Weyl’s activities as a young
adult in the 1920s. It was part of her political experience, and this
experience affected her daily actions. Although Weyl’s sessions
targeted a broader and more coeducational audience than traditional
women’s reading sessions, the focus was nevertheless the same: to
convey the groups’ message by encouraging an interactive educational
experience apart from mainstream political and social rhetoric. These
activities took advantage of emerging space in political culture and

integrated ideas from core party politics as well as transnational pacifist and feminist networks in outlying political arenas.
Gertrud Eysoldt, a prominent actress, teacher, and radio announcer, kicked off the theme ‘‘Comrades in Humanity’’ in October 1926
with her lecture ‘‘America and China.’’ Between 1905 and 1934,
Eysoldt taught over 2000 students at the German Theater Acting
School and was extremely popular with young Berliners. In addition,
her biographer, Carsten Niemann, notes that Eysoldt was enamored
with new radio technology and was a regular broadcaster in the
1920s. Listeners could tune in to her programs in Germany as well as
abroad. Niemann also describes Eysoldt’s deep commitment to pacifism and her use of many different venues to promote peace in German society.47 Although Eysoldt was a German actress, she drew
many ideas from outside German national borders to promote peace
and transnational awareness in her broadcasts in Berlin. Her background and deep commitment to peace connected her with DPSt goals,
while her international reputation drew attention to the Berlin
organization’s efforts to promote peace by looking beyond national
boundaries.
In preparation for Eysoldt’s talk, the DPSt produced fliers in
handy half-sheets to publicize the ‘‘Comrades in Humanity’’ event,
purposefully highlighting Eysoldt’s name in bold, red letters (see
Figure 1). The DPSt counted on the actress’s popularity to draw a
large crowd and her enthusiasm for pacifism and the topic to keep up
the momentum for the remainder of the series.48 Weyl rode Eysoldt’s
coattails, scheduling her ‘‘Comrades in Humanity: North and South’’
session exactly two weeks after ‘‘America and China.’’ Two weeks
later, Rolf Gärtner delivered the third ‘‘Comrades in Humanity’’
installment entitled ‘‘The New Russia takes Flight,’’ building on the
energy of the previous two events.49 Such clever marketing strategies
no doubt contributed to the impact of DPSt reading sessions as they
sought to expand pacifist activism in Berlin.
Weyl’s ‘‘North and South’’ discussion attests to her blending of
pacifist, feminist, and transnational ideas in the reading sessions. The
title itself suggests a broad nongeographical perspective and the flyer
announced that Weyl read from Danish feminist author Karin
Michaelis’ work as well as from the correspondence of iconic Italian
actress, Eleonora Duse.50 In this evening session, Weyl encouraged the
audience to look beyond German borders to women who challenged
the status quo. Michaelis’ famous work The Dangerous Age chronicles

Figure 1. DPSt Flier. Courtesy of League of Nations and Peace
Movement Collection, Deutsches Friedenskartell, United Nations
Library at Geneva.

the life of a divorced woman at the turn of the century. Biographer
Helen Sheehy declares that throughout her acting career Duse
‘‘expanded the very idea of Woman’’ and ‘‘she revealed the immense
gap between accepted ideas of woman and what a woman really
was.’’51 These iconic women represented a long tradition of feminist
thinking on women’s issues often considered private. Weyl drew on
their legacies to establish dialogues across national borders based on
shared values and to encourage German activists to look outside their
own nation for inspiration. Her innovative use of Social Democratic
tradition combined with an emphasis on pacifist, feminist, and
socialist ideas contributed to the success of the Berlin DPSt in the
mid-1920s and reveals the growing potential of peripheral political
culture initiatives in Weimar democracy.
Weyl’s use of the reading sessions was a distinct and promising
effort to promote the goals of the 1926 DPSt program, which called
for open international cooperation between students and academics of

all countries. The DPST explicitly acknowledged its support of
Weimar individual and group networks, advocating ‘‘a basic reorganization of the relationships of individual person to individual person,
group to group and country to country.’’ The fourth program point
declared support for the League of Nations and efforts to make it a
‘‘true supranational working-group.’’52 This point highlights DPSt
members’ desire to see the League become a more transnational rather
than strictly international organization, a goal shared by many Social
Democrats who envisioned the League as one of peoples rather than
nations.53 DPSt members and fellow pacifists, though limited to the
periphery of political culture, structured their transnational ambitions
carefully in an effort to bring cross-border collaboration and awareness into the larger national political arena. The 1927 Munich peace
exhibit further demonstrates the success of transnational pacifist initiatives in breaking out from the limits of both national and political
frameworks during the Weimar Republic.
TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKING ON DISPLAY

The 1927 peace exhibition entitled ‘‘Peace Movements and Peace
Activism in all Countries’’ is perhaps the best indicator of the expanding transnational influences in German political culture. This Munich
exhibit brought together material from all over the world and traveled
to various cities throughout Germany. Hallgarten describes the perseverance of pacifist Marie Zehetmaier as the main catalyst for the project. Failing to gain support from the Munich DFK group, Zehetmaier
appealed to Quidde as leader of the DFG because he had been out
of town when her exhibit proposal was rejected as too costly.54
Zehetmaier’s personal agency brought this transnational vision to
fruition. With Quidde’s aid, Zehetmaier gathered so much material
from various international groups in her home that Hallgarten marveled
at how she could live ‘‘in such a tangled mass of paper.’’55 The overwhelming enthusiasm and the speed with which Zehetmaier was able to
collect project materials (less than one year) demonstrates the tight links
between pacifist networks in Germany and abroad. As a member of the
DFK, Hallgarten voted against Zehetmaier’s 1926 proposal, yet she
could not deny the mounting enthusiasm for the innovative exhibit from
both German and international pacifist organizations.
Hallgarten herself represents an intriguing figure in Weimar political culture. A middle-class feminist as well as a pacifist, she insists in

her autobiography that she never belonged to a political party. Her
inclination toward socialism is documented, however, especially at the
beginning of the Weimar period when she was a member of the
League of Socialist Women (Bund Sozialistischer Frauen). In addition,
her biographers note that she voted socialist in the 1919 elections even
though her husband voted democratic. Hallgarten’s participation in
the 1919 WILPF Zürich Conference directly after the war, despite
extreme financial hardship and difficult traveling conditions, also demonstrates her dedication as an international activist. In addition, she
represented the DFK at the first Munich No-More-War demonstration
in 1922, enthusiastically noting the participation of American pacifists
in her memoirs.56 Hallgarten’s activities reveal the extent to
which transnational and national political culture intersected in the
Weimar era.
The idea for a peace exhibit may have been initiated through the
individual efforts of pacifists such as Zehetmaier, Hallgarten, and
Quidde, but the trio’s combined connections to larger pacifist networks helped make the exhibition a success. Hallgarten reached out to
Munich leaders for support and was surprised to find that of the two
main religious groups, Catholic officials were more likely to support
the initiative than Lutheran. In fact, Hallgarten, a member of the
Lutheran church, was deeply disappointed by the intense negative
reaction of the clergymen, one of whom mocked not only the idea of
peace to her face, but the League of Nations as well.57 Interestingly,
Hallgarten attributed this difference to a Catholic predisposition to be
internationally minded based on the church’s supranational structure
as opposed to the national structure of the Lutheran church. She surmised that Catholic officials transcribed positive experiences from
wider church frameworks to the proposed transnational German peace
exhibit and therefore supported the effort. Here, Hallgarten shows a
keen awareness of differences between transnational and national perspectives in her own political activities.
Although the Munich DFK officially declined the project, many of
its member organizations participated. The three largest exhibit rooms
reflected complementary involvement of the DFG, WILPF, and
Zehetmaier’s religious pacifist organization as main Munich sponsors.58 Contributions for the displays came from all over the world.
After an entrance exhibit illustrating the costs and horrors of World
War I through photographs, artwork, and graphic statistical charts,
the organizers dedicated a room solely to the League of Nations. The

League’s Information Section provided extensive materials highlighting
its international organization as well as past, present, and future diplomatic work. DFG organizers hoped the League’s prominent place in
the exhibit would be thought-provoking for visitors and simultaneously pressure League officials to develop the body into ‘‘a true
instrument of peace,’’ something that many Weimar pacifists, including
the DPSt as noted above, advocated.59 The first room reflected
Weimar pacifists’ efforts to remind Germans of the horrific war and
the second advocated a solution.
The peace exhibit prominently displayed and celebrated critical
moments where pacifists reached across national borders and
accepted so-called enemies without prejudice. One way participants
in supranational networks demonstrated their international consciousness, according to the historian Leila Rupp, was to ‘‘reach out
to those [who were] supposed to be … enemies.’’60 WILPF members’ efforts to bridge national animosity with personal acts of symbolic ‘‘sisterhood’’ are well-documented in Rupp’s Worlds of
Women.61 A poster captioned ‘‘Women from ‘Enemy’ Countries
Meet in Zurich in May 1919’’ from the exhibit reinforces the point
(see Figure 2). It displayed a collage of photographs taken at the
1919 WILPF meeting and further emphasized the lasting impact of
these conscious acts of transnational cooperation as well as the pride
felt by participants.62
At the time, women from across the globe had gathered in Zurich
to protest the harsh peace treaty terms simultaneously under discussion in Versailles. Vellacott emphasizes the contrast between the
female Hague delegates in 1919 brought together by ‘‘a shared and
terrible experience of war’’ and the statesmen at Versailles. Instead of
focusing on preventing war, these men ‘‘thought in terms of
retribution, of gains, of enforcement, of maintaining the upper hand,’’
Vellacott argues. ‘‘[I]ndividually, each worked for the perceived
advantage of his own country.’’63 WILPF delegates to the 1919 meeting built upon foundations laid by the International Committee of
Women for Permanent Peace at The Hague, and their feminist networks remained grounded in the same spirit of conscious transnational
cooperative action throughout the Weimar period.64 The poster’s
designers captured this moment of purposeful female solidarity, presenting photographs of women from various countries, including
prominent German personalities Anita Augspurg, Lida Gustava
Heymann, and Hallgarten. The photos vividly display transnational

Figure 2. ‘‘Women from ‘Enemy’ Countries Meet in Zurich in May
1919.’’ Courtesy of League of Nations and Peace Movement Collection, Deutsches Friedenskartell, United Nations Library at Geneva.

interpersonal contact by including women of several nationalities as
subjects (see Figure 3). The emphasis was the product of conference
participants’ efforts to demonstrate international female solidarity in
1919 as well as the pride of Hallgarten and exhibit organizers to illustrate this moment of true transnational cooperation. After all, Vellacott reiterates, ‘‘war requires an enemy, and it is hard to consider as
enemies those you know well.’’65 The poster format was a conscious
demonstration of transnationalism in both moments, one example of
many throughout the exhibit.
The focal point of the peace exhibit, a large sarcophagus, represented another symbol of purposeful transnational solidarity among
the displays. In Munich, the casket ‘‘ruled’’ the stage of the exhibit
hall where Quidde, a transnationally recognized figure, had laid a
golden laurel wreath on it. A nearby sign displayed the words ‘‘To all

Figure 3. Close up from ‘‘Women from ‘Enemy’ Countries Meet in
Zurich in May 1919.’’ From left to right: Anita Augspurg (Germany),
Charlotte Despard (Great Britain), Lida Gustava Heymann
(Germany), Rosa Genoni (Italy), Leopoldine Kulka (Austria), Andrée
Jouve (France). Courtesy of League of Nations and Peace Movement
Collection, Deutsches Friedenskartell, United Nations Library at
Geneva.
those who died for their country 1914–1918.’’66 This gesture demonstrated a tremendous effort toward international reconciliation and
recognized suffering on both sides of the battlefield. The sarcophagus
display revisited the earlier tentative effort to equate the experiences
of all victims of aggression, which international feminists and pacifists
had grappled with in transnational discussions of the 1922 No-MoreWar demonstrations.67 By 1927, however, Quidde boldly used this
symbol to invoke a sense of common experience and brotherhood
with foreign soldiers and their families. The sarcophagus featured in
several DFG announcements for the exhibit, with authors often stressing the transnational solidarity represented by the display. Quidde’s
efforts were meant to have visual shock value as well as educational
merit, causing Germans to think about similarities between themselves
and victims of war in every nation.
Despite DFK misgivings, the peace exhibit was a hit, launching
from its Munich base and traveling in 1927 and 1928 to the German
cities of Würzburg, Erfurt, Harburg, and Dresden. The exhibit drew

many school classes, and visitors came ‘‘again and again’’ to view
the displays.68 What started as a local pacifist’s vision of bringing
transnational awareness to Munich transformed into a national exhibit, which itself attracted notice within and beyond German borders.69
This exhibit was indeed a site of transnational exchange in German
political culture. It represents a rich moment of cooperation between
pacifists, Social Democrats, and feminists as they worked together to
bring transnational awareness to their own regions.
Gerhart Seger, the General Secretary of the DFG and later SPD
representative to the Reichstag, traveled from Berlin to help prepare
the exhibit and generate publicity. Seger also spoke on the destructive
potential of future wars in the evening lecture series held in tandem
with the Munich exhibition.70 Although the lecture series poster did
not explicitly identify Seger with the SPD, his presence and participation suggest that party officials did not actively block him from publically supporting a pacifist agenda. In fact, Seger was not unique.
Reports in the WILPF publication Völkerversöhnende Frauenarbeit
from December 1928 claimed that Dresden WILPF members, many of
whom were Social Democrats, brought the peace exhibition to their
city. In the same report, the WILPF group in Darmstadt boasted of
great support for their publicity campaigns from Social Democratic
publicists.71 Even though the SPD withdrew official support from
peace organizations in the mid-1920s, individual party members maintained connections between formal politics and penumbra political
activities in the pursuit of peace.
POLITICAL LITMUS TEST

Despite these examples of cooperation and intersection, the pacifist milieu and Social Democracy were put to the test in 1928. After
an intense election campaign that promised ‘‘food for children’’
instead of funding for new Panzerkreuzer (battleships), Social Democratic cabinet members turned their backs on the campaign promise
and their own party colleagues. The ministers supported the ship
construction project, believing they had made a logical compromise
by allowing the battleships to be built and preserving political harmony in a fragile coalition government.72 SPD historian Donna Harsch observes, however, that the ‘‘decision unleashed a storm of
protest in the SPD more intense than any since the [1918 ⁄ 1919] revolution.’’73

A key part of Social Democrats’ disappointment in their ministers
derived from the recent 1928 election campaign against rearmament.
SPD candidates from all levels jumped on the controversial issue,
fueling the fire with slogans critiquing battleship supporters’ efforts to
prioritize funds for weapons over the basic needs of the population.
The campaign was in large part successful, gaining the SPD more than
twenty new Reichstag seats. There was a strong pacifist presence in
the party by 1928, in part thanks to the merger with the USPD, and
peace historian Karl Holl notes that the majority of organized pacifism
rejected the proposed battleships.74 Harsch evaluates the general
appeal of the slogan, stating that it added ‘‘spice’’ to SPD propaganda
and tapped into the ‘‘antimilitarism [that] was a potent ingredient in
the Social Democratic worldview.’’75 Campaign rhetoric drew attention to party antimilitarism and social welfare concerns during the
election, intensifying the contrast between campaign promises and the
ministers’ actions once in office.
Outcry from all ranks of the SPD and peace organizations flooded
newspapers and dominated meeting minutes within days of the battleship vote. Pacifist convictions as well as a strong belief in party discipline and upholding electoral promises drove many party members
and supporters to denounce the decision and demand greater accountability for the SPD ministers’ actions. Social Democrats, pacifists, and
feminists who had collaborated successfully on Weimar educational
and protest activities were outraged by this controversy. Fabian called
for the SPD to leave the governing coalition and mobilize popular
political opposition against the battleship construction akin to the NoMore-War protests.76 In a DFG press release outlining the group’s
objections, secretary Seger declared the decision not only represented
‘‘the beginning of rearmament’’ but was ‘‘a slap in the face of the
voting masses.’’77
The SPD ministers’ decision was severely disillusioning from the
perspective of many party sympathizers and members. Pacifist Social
Democrat Heinrich Ströbel fumed that the incident revealed ‘‘all the
[Social Democratic] disarmament and No-More-War talk’’ as ‘‘blue
smoke and world peace as a soap bubble.’’78 In addition, grassroots
education efforts meant to empower new voters were all for naught
if elected leaders ignored those newfound voices. True to Fabian’s
call for popular protest, pacifist groups organized public events in
the weeks after the crisis began. The DFK organization, the German
League for Human Rights, for example, hosted an event entitled

‘‘Panzerkreuzer, the People’s Will and the Government’’ on August
24.79 These dissident voices, fostered by the sustained promotion of
transnational awareness, culminated in demands for a people’s referendum to take matters into their own hands.
Intense reactions to the battleship scandal were not limited to the
political penumbra. Party members across the ranks were equally outraged by the actions of their ministers. The 1929 Magdeburg party
meeting was fraught with arguments that party discipline had broken
down and the ministers were out of line. Cabinet member Hermann
Müller claimed he never personally uttered the much-criticized
campaign promise. Other speakers passed the blame around from the
ministers to party opposition, and even to the voters who did not muster enough support to create a cabinet with a Social Democratic
majority.80 Despite these disagreements, representatives at the meeting
produced the ‘‘Guidelines for Military Policies’’ (Richtlinien zur
Wehrpolitik). The guidelines emphasized the SPD’s position against
war as an instrument of diplomacy and sought the democratization of
the League of Nations. Social Democrats envisaged the diplomatic
organization as a league of peoples rather than a league of states so
that it could become an ‘‘effective instrument of peace.’’ Defensively,
the guidelines reaffirmed SPD foundations in transnational ideas of
international socialism stating, ‘‘[s]ocialism is the power that will
bring the world lasting peace.’’81
Many historians cite the battleship scandal as a massive breakdown in SPD party organization and, especially for Harsch, one
moment that could be considered the beginning of the end for Social
Democrats in the Weimar Republic. The scandal represents much
more than inner-party strife and the breakdown of party and pacifist
cooperation, however. The outcry against the ministers’ decision from
all corners of the German Left is particularly telling. As Potthoff
notes, SPD leaders began to look inward for solutions to broader
problems of Weimar democracy after 1925. They failed to consider
that pacifism and international understanding had become a common
language among many participants in core and penumbra political culture as well as national and transnational networks. The issue even
attracted attention outside German borders. Dutch Social Democrat
Dr. Johan Willem Albarda wrote to Müller about the reaction to the
scandal in the Netherlands: ‘‘[w]hen we held a number of demonstrations for disarmament on September 16 the streets were covered with
huge signs with Panzerkreuzer!’’82 The scandal, therefore, can be seen

as a litmus test for subtle changes in political consciousness on the
German Left. It reveals expanding transnational awareness in the
national arena and sites of tension between SPD leaders and individual
activists. Furthermore, the scandal illustrates the impact of national
events beyond delineated borders.
CONCLUSION

This examination of pacifists, Social Democrats, and feminists
reveals that the ‘‘echo’’ of pacifism in Weimar political culture is
worth further consideration. Fueled by wartime experiences, these
social actors built on pre-existing transnational networks and
embraced ideas, awareness, and cooperation from beyond national
borders. SPD members such as Fabian, Seger, and Weyl openly participated in pacifist activities, exchanging ideas, developing transnational
connections, and, as Baer proclaimed, rallying around a sense of international responsibility. Their participation in pacifist initiatives opened
up new political space in Weimar politics, normalizing cooperation
between Social Democrats and pacifists through individual interaction.
The battleship scandal refocused attention on a key problem for Social
Democratic leaders: voter awareness was evolving and they needed to
acknowledge the impact of these changes, including increasing transnational pacifist influences, to be effective in the political arena. The
peace party was once again in conflict with its constituency.
Eerily similar to the party truce over war credits, political tensions
in 1928 triggered a limited, and in the eyes of pacifists, empty response
from SPD leaders, who turned inward for the sake of party stability
rather than recognizing increasingly effective grassroots efforts to shape
Weimar political culture. In stark contrast, initiatives such as the NoMore-War protests, WILPF vacation courses, DPSt reading sessions,
and the 1927 peace exhibition promoted transnational networks and
cooperation in an environment notorious for fostering rising nationalism and militarism before 1933. These case studies reveal a visible
layer of pacifist activity in the Weimar Republic that has been obscured
by scholarly attention to the rise of National Socialism and the collapse
of the Republic. Despite increasing limits on political activism, the
development of new political space between core and periphery
fostered by individual cooperation on the Left during the Weimar
Republic helped lay the groundwork for transnational interaction and
peace politics in postwar German political culture.
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